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1. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a woman driving along a highway in North Dakota. 
A man, a resident of South Dakota, driving a truck crashes into 
the woman's vehicle. The woman suffers massive injuries and 
spends twenty-four days in the hospital. Her family retains an 
attorney and sues the other driver in a North Dakota county 
where the accident occurred. The defendant files a motion to 
dismiss on the theory that a North Dakota county court has no 
jurisdiction over him. The court denies the motion, and that 
decision is affirmed on appeal. The case moves to trial. 
Now imagine a woman driving along the same highway, 
except it is within the exterior boundaries of a reservation of the 
Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation, located in North Dakota. 
A man, a resident of South Dakota, driving a truck crashes into 
the woman's vehicle. She suffers massive injuries and spends 
twenty-four days in the hospital. Her family retains an attorney 
and sues the other driver in the reservation's tribal court. The 
defendant files a motion to dismiss on the theory that the tribal 
court has no jurisdiction over him. The court denies the motion, 
and that decision is affirmed on appeal. The case does not move 
to trial because the defendant brings a claim in federal district 
court seeking an injunction against the tribal court on the theory 
that the tribal court has no jurisdiction over him. This time, the 
defendant's motion is granted. 
Why? 
The second fact pattern is a simplified and modified version 
of the facts that the Supreme Court reviewed in Strate v. A-J 
Contractors. l Automobile accidents are common in every 
jurisdiction within the United States.2 Indian Country is no 
1. Strate v. A-I Contractors, Inc., 520 U.S. 438, 442-44 (1997). The Court in Strate 
concluded that the tribal court could not have jurisdiction over the lawsuit because the 
accident occurred on non-Indian land-a state-maintained highway. See id. at 455-56. 
2. Cf Car-Accidents.com, 2000 Car Accident Statistics: Fatalities by State, 
http://www.car-accidents.com/pagesistats/2000_by _state.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) 
(providing car accident fatalities statistics by state). 
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exception.3 In the first fact pattern, the denial of the motion to 
dismiss on jurisdictional grounds is an easy and noncontroversial 
question. In the Indian Country fact pattern, the question of 
jurisdiction is the most important question in the case. It appears 
that the question of tribal court civil adjudicatory jurisdiction is 
one of the most important and controversial questions in 
American Indian law.4 The reason Indian Country is different is 
the Supreme Court's fear that tribal courts will apply a common 
law that prejudices nonmembers.5 
American common law originates in a common law that 
evolved over centuries in Britain, moved across the ocean to the 
United States, and survived the Revolution.6 This Anglo-
American common law developed in accordance with the mores of 
English and American culture and was marked with a powerful 
dose offormalism.7 For example, at common law, the essentials to 
an enforceable contract were "the use of parchment or paper, 
sealing by the obligor, and delivery as a deed, normally witnessed 
and attested."s One purpose of these formalities was to make 
3. See, e.g., C. Matthew Snipp, The Size and Distribution of the American Indian 
Population: Fertility, Morality, Migration, and Residence, 16 POPULATION RES. & POL 'y 
REV. 61, 76 (1997) (recognizing automobile accidents to be the primary cause of death 
among young American Indians). 
4. American "Indian Law" is defined by Ninth Circuit Senior Judge William Canby 
as "that body of law dealing with the status of the Indian tribes and their special 
relationship to the federal government, with all the attendant consequences for the tribes 
and their members, the states and their citizens, and the federal government." WILLIAM 
C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw IN A NUTSHELL 1 (4th ed. 2004). "In this application, 
'Indian Law' might better be termed 'Federal Law About Indians.'" Id. "Tribal law" is 
defined as the law of the various and individual federally recognized Indian tribes in the 
United States. See id. at 3 (including "the internal law that each tribe "applies to its own 
affairs and members" and ranging "from oral tradition to entire codes borrowed nearly 
intact from non-Indian sources"). 
5. Federal Indian law classifies people in three ways: first, "members," or people 
who are enrolled members or citizens of a federally recognized Indian tribe; second, 
"nonmembers," or people who are not "members;" and third, "nonmember Indians," a term 
used in the criminal jurisdiction context to refer to Indians within the jurisdiction of a 
tribe not their own. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,210 (2004) (addressing 
the congressionally granted authority of a tribe to prosecute a "nonmember Indian" for 
criminal misdemeanor); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) 
(distinguishing between a tribal court's jurisdiction over "members" and "nonmembers"). 
6. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 15 (1973) 
("The basic substratum of American law ... is English."); GoRDON S. WOOD, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 291-305 (lnst. of Early Am. History 
and Culture ed., 1998) (discussing the development of a distinctly American system oflaw 
and politics in the context ofthe American Revolution). 
7. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw OF CONTRACT: THE RISE 
OF THE ACTION OF AsSUMPSIT 5 (1975) ("The medieval common law was a formulary 
system, whose content and basic structure were determined, to a very considerable 
extent, by the catalogue of original writs in the Register."). 
8. Id. at 90 (citation omitted). 
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clearer "any signs of monkey business."9 The common law of 
contract, for example, has since moved away from the formal 
requirement of a seal for a somewhat less formal requirement of 
consideration. 10 
In contrast, tribal common law evolved from a much 
different source of culture and attendant policy considerations. 
While it is impossible to generalize, we can be sure that many 
Indian communities held inviolate an oral promise without any 
formalities at all, for example.ll Contracts between Indians came 
in contexts of "long-run relationships with trading 
partnerships ... [that] build trust and reliance among the 
parties.,,12 Tribal communities did engage in a type of formalism 
that could mark a contract, although the underlying exchange 
often was of "gifts," not merchandise.13 Unlike Anglo-American 
common law that derived from "status, ,,14 tribal common law 
derived from "[p]ublic consensus and harmony.,,15 It should be 
easy to observe from this comparison that American common law 
and tribal common law derive from different cultures and 
traditions on a fundamental level. 
Federal and state courts apply Anglo-American common law 
as they always have,16 but tribal courts have unusual difficulty 
identifying and applying tribal common law. 17 For a variety of 
9. Id. 
10. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 28 (1981) (explicating the Anglo-
American doctrine of consideration). 
11. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The 
Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Part 11), 46 AM. J. COMPo L. 509, 548 
(1998) ("[C]ontracts are valid traditionally by mutual consent. Neither writing, nor 
consideration, nor witnesses is required. "). 
12. Id. at 547. 
13. KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 228 (1941) 
("[N]o price was set beforehand for services to be rendered, so that the compensation was 
phrased, and in good part felt, as a gift given in appreciation for a helpful act."). 
14. Cf Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 553 (1933) 
("One of the most influential of modern saws is Maine's famous dictum that the progress 
ofthe law has been from status to contract"). 
15. RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAw FROM CLAN TO 
COURT 11 (1975). See generally JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE 
OF INDIGENOUS LAw 56-76 (2002) (discussing Aninishaabe and Canadian Aboriginal 
common law as applied in Canadian courts). 
16. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARv. L. REV. 881, 890-96 (1986) (defining "'federal common law'" and examining its 
application). While "[c]onsiderations of federalism and separation of powers combine to 
make us skeptical about courts formulating very broad federal common law," federal 
courts continue to make law both through pronouncements of law and through 
interpretation.Id. at 890-96,931; see also Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law 
in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 927-31 (2004) (contrasting the state and 
federal courts' abilities to create common law). 
17. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Troublesome Aspects of Western Influences on Tribal 
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reasons relating to the history of federal Indian policy/8 tribal 
courts rely upon Anglo-American common law to decide many, if 
not most, of the cases before them.I9 Tribal courts have made a 
strong effort to restore tribal, rather than Anglo-American, 
custom and tradition to their adjudicatory decisionmaking,20 but 
the process is slow. 
Members of the Supreme Court appear to have assumed that 
tribal courts apply a tribal common law that is so far from Anglo-
American common law as to be unrecognizable to non-Indians.21 
This assumption arises in the context of a tribal court exercising 
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. In 2001, the Supreme Court 
decided Nevada v. Hicks, an unremarkable case holding that 
tribal members may not sue in tribal court for the on-reservation 
tortious conduct and civil rights violations of state officials 
investigating off-reservation breaches of state law.22 To be sure, 
scholars and tribal leaders criticized the decision more for its 
reasoning than its holding,23 which is very narrow. The Court left 
Justice Systems and Laws, 1 TRIBAL L.J. (2000), http://tlj.unm.edu/articles/volume_lI 
skibinelindex.php (identifying several efforts by the federal government to influence tribal 
common law and discussing "some of the problems associated with efforts to 'integrate' 
tribal justice systems into the United States political system"). 
18. See id. (reviewing the federal government's attempted imposition of Western 
norms on the tribal judiciary, influence on Indian culture, and integration of Indian 
tribes). 
19. E.g., Kalantari v. Spirit Mountain Gaming, Inc., 32 Indian L. Rep. 6079, 6080 
(Grand Ronde Tribal App. Ct. May 16, 2005) (on file with the Houston Law Review) 
(basing decision on U.S. law). 
20. E.g., Navajo Nation v. Crockett, 7 Navajo Rtpr 237, 240 (Navajo Sup. Ct. 1996), 
available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinionsi1996.NANN.0000006.htm (deciding a 
free speech claim on the basis of tribal custom and tradition, saying "Navajo common law 
is the law of preference in the courts ofthe Navajo Nation"). 
21. See infra note 58 (explaining Justice Rehnquist's use of precedent to arrive at 
the conclusion that Indian courts will not treat non-Indians appropriately). 
22. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374-75 (2001). 
23. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 
119 HARv. L. REV. 431, 457-59 (2005) (criticizing the Court for its growing tendency to 
shrink tribal authority proactively while ignoring foundational Indian law); David H. 
Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind 
Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 278-79 (2001) (observing that the 
Court's recent jurisprudence rebukes traditional deference to Congress and turns a blind 
eye to precedent); Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicability of American Law to the 
Indian Nations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1595, 1607 (2004) (criticizing recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence as "devastating," noting that decisions over "the last three decades ... have 
seriously eroded ... inherent tribal judicial authority"); Joseph William Singer, Canons of 
Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 
647-48 (2003) (speculating that in Hicks, the Court constricted tribal authority, 
permitting regulation of consenting parties only); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense 
Out of Nevada v. Hicks: A Reinterpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 347, 349 (2001) ("[Olne 
of the fundamental problems with the Court's analysis stems from its failure to 
adequately conceptualize the ... tribal 'right to exclude.'"); cf Ronald Eagleye Johnny, 
Special Feature, Nevada v. Hicks: No Threat to Most Nevada Tribes, 25 AM. INDIAN L. 
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open very important and fundamental questions regarding the 
civil jurisdiction of tribal courts to adjudicate the rights of 
nonmembers.24 As Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, ''We 
leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over 
nonmember defendants in general.,,25 While the question of tribal 
court civil jurisdiction over nonmembers rages in the federal 
courts, the Court has not yet decided the issue.26 The Court's 
most recent statement came in dicta in 1997, where the Court 
"assumed that 'where tribes possess authority to regulate the 
activities of nonmembers, civil jurisdiction over disputes arising 
out of such activities presumably lies in the tribal courts,' 
without distinguishing between nonmember plaintiffs and 
nonmember defendants.,,27 
The real concern amongst tribal advocates in the aftermath 
of Hicks was the surprising concurrence by Justice Souter, who 
wrote what amounts to an opening attack on the future 
application of tribal law to nonmembers.28 Though the application 
of tribal law to nonmembers was not squarely before the Court in 
Hicks,29 Justice Souter took the time to lay the framework for a 
broad holding in future cases that tribal law should never apply 
to nonmembers.30 Despite the fact that several years have passed 
REV. 381, 381 (2002) (arguing that Nevada tribal courts tend to require express 
nonmember consent before taking jurisdiction over the nonmembers); Edwin Kneedler, 
Indian Law in the Last Thirty Years: How Cases Get to the Supreme Court and How They 
Are Briefed, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 274, 277 (2003) (identifying the Hicks decision as 
unsurprising because the case involved state law enforcement officers defending their 
official conduct). See generally Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law 
Decisions: Deviations {rom Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial 
Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 411 (2003) (searching for the constitutional 
foundation of the holding in Hicks). 
24. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358 n.2. 
25. Id. 
26. E.g., Smith v. Salish Kootenai ColI., 434 F.3d 1127, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc) ("[AJ non-Indian plaintiff consents to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal court by filing 
claims against an Indian defendant arising out of activities within the reservation where 
the defendant is located."), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2893; Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 
805,813-14 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming that absent an authorizing statute or treaty, tribal 
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims against nonmembers arising out of 
their conduct on state highways); MacArthur v. San Juan, 391 F. Supp. 2d 895, 934 (D. 
Utah 2005) ("The full extent of implicit divestiture has yet to be determined, resulting in 
no small amount of uncertainty and confusion as to the scope of tribes' inherent civil 
authority over non-indians .... " (citations omitted)). 
27. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358 n.2 (quoting Strate v. A-I Contractors, Inc., 520 U.S. 438, 
453 (1997)). 
28. See id. at 375-85 (Souter, J., concurring). 
29. See id. at 356-57 (majority opinion). 
30. See id. at 381 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[IJt is undeniable that a tribe's 
remaining inherent civil jurisdiction to adjudicate civil claims arising out of acts 
committed on a reservation depends in the first instance on the character of the 
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since Justice Souter characterized tribal law in this fashion, no 
scholar has responded in a direct manner to this description. 
This Article argues that Justice Souter's characterization of the 
"substantive law" that tribal courts apply is an oversimplification 
of the on-the-ground realities of tribal law. 
This Article attempts to create a simple and reasonable 
framework by which judges, lawyers, and scholars can classifY 
tribal law. "Tribal law" as applied by tribal courts is not 
monolithic.31 This Article divides tribal law or "tribal common 
law" into two broad categories-"intertribal common law" and 
"intratribal common law." As a general matter, intertribal 
common law is the common law applied by tribal courts to cases 
arising out of an Anglo-American legal construct, such as an 
employment contract.32 Intertribal common law tends to mirror 
federal and state common law, with some differences. Intratribal 
common law, by contrast, is the common law applied by tribal 
courts and other tribal dispute resolution venues to disputes 
arising out of a tribal legal construct, such as the inheritance 
rights to on-reservation hunting territories.33 Intratribal common 
law often is the unwritten and unique customary and traditional 
law deriving from Indian culture and languages. It is the law of 
the Indigenous communities from time immemorial. This Article 
will show that intratribal common law will not, except in 
extraordinary circumstances, apply to cases where nonmembers 
are a party in interest. Distinguishing in an intelligent manner 
between intertribal and intratribal common law should allay 
fears from the Justices that "outsiders" will be disadvantaged by 
tribal courts. 
Part II of this Article describes the open question before the 
Court-whether tribal courts have civil jurisdiction over 
individual over whom jurisdiction is claimed, not on the title to the soil on which he 
acted."). 
31. See NELL JESSUP NEWTON ET AL., COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 
§ 4.05[31 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., Matthew Bender 2005) (1941) ("[Ilt may be a 
mistake to equate tribal tradition and custom with tribal common law, because tribal 
common law may be a broader category .... "). 
32. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Employment Separation: Tribal Law 
Enigma, Tribal Governance Paradox, and Tribal Court Conundrum, 38 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 273, 290-315 (2005) (noting the need for improvements in the law of tribal 
employment separation that give credence to Tribal communities' unique needs). 
33. See generally Russel Lawrence Barsh, Coast Salish Property Law: An 
Alternative Paradigm for Environmental Relationships, 12 HAsTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL'y 1 (2005) (examining the Puget Sound's and Gulf of Georgia's indigenous peoples' 
prevailing paradigm of environmental controls); Frank G. Speck, The Family Hunting 
Band as a Basis of Algonkian Social Organization, 17 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 289, 290 
(1915) (surveying kinship groups from various tribes and their respective laws, including 
property and social rules). 
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nonmembers in general. Part II will describe Nevada v. Hicks 
and the recent cases that identify "fairness to outsiders" as a 
possible serious problem in tribal court adjudication of 
nonmember rights, examining in detail Justice Souter's Hicks 
concurrence. Part III provides a theory of differentiating between 
intertribal common law and intratribal common law, providing 
examples in several subject areas of tribal court adjudication of 
how the theory of differentiation could work in the real world. 
Part IV concludes the Article with a call for the federal courts to 
recognize the difference between intertribal and intratribal 
common law, with a concomitant recognition that nonmembers 
are not prejudiced by the application of tribal law by tribal 
courts. Part IV also offers a preliminary response to the concerns 
and questions that may be raised by the application of this 
theory. This Article concludes that the recognition of different 
kinds of tribal common law by federal courts will meet the twin 
goals of preserving and advancing tribal sovereignty and 
protecting the rights of nonmembers. 
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING TRIBAL COURT 
CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS 
Tribal governments have long exercised civil regulatory 
jurisdiction over nonmembers.34 Indian treaties recognized in an 
implicit manner the authority of tribes to control and regulate 
the conduct of non-Indians passing through reservation lands.35 
Federal courts have long held that an Indian tribe's right to tax 
nonmembers conducting business in Indian Country is 
"inherent.,,36 Indian tribes have the power to exclude 
nonmembers from their territories37 and to place conditions on 
their continued presence.3S As a corollary, tribal courts also have 
34. According to the Supreme Court, Indian tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
35. E.g., Treaty with the Sioux Indians art. 16, U.S.-Tribes of Sioux Indians, Apr. 
29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, 640 (prohibiting any "white person" from settling upon, occupying, 
or passing through Sioux Indian land without their consent). 
36. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 134-41 (1982) ("inherent"); 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) ("A tribe may regulate, through 
taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, 
leases, or other arrangements. "). 
37. See NEWTON ET AL., supra note 31, § 4.01(2)[e] ("A tribe needs no grant of 
authority from the federal government to exercise the inherent power of exclusion from 
tribal territory, either as a government or as a landowner."). 
38. [d. § 4.01[2] [f] (explaining tribal authority over reservation land to include a 
regulatory power over nonmember entrants). 
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the authority to adjudicate the rights of nonmembers in civil 
cases.
39 
But in recent decades, the Supreme Court has placed 
severe limitations on the authority of Indian tribes and tribal 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers.40 American 
Indian law scholars have long objected to the Court's results 
and approach.41 Professor Phil Frickey describes the Court's 
approach as a form of "ruthless pragmatism" when it comes to 
tribal sovereignty.42 This Part identifies the relevant cases and 
discusses the possible underlying reasons for the Court's 
approach. 
A. The Montana Rule and Justice Souter's "Difficulty" 
In 1959, the Supreme Court opened what Professor 
Charles Wilkinson called the beginning of the "modern era of 
39. E.g., Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) ("Civil jurisdiction 
over [nonmember, on-reservation conduct) presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless 
affirmatively limited [by treaty or statute)."}; Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe 
ofIndians, 471 U.S. 845, 854-55 (1985) (concluding that Congress's divesting tribal courts 
of jurisdiction over criminal matters only, shows a clear intent to leave tribal courts 
jurisdiction over civil matters); Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde v. Strategic Wealth 
Mgmt., Inc., 32 Indian L. Rep. 6148, 6150 (Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde 
Community of Or. Tribal Ct. Aug. 5, 2005) (noting that the tribal court's jurisdiction over 
civil actions extends to the limits of the Constitution and laws of the Tribe and the United 
States); Bank of Hoven v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 32 Indian L. Rep. 6001, 6003 
(Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal App. Ct. 2004) (affirming the lower court's exercise of 
jurisdiction over a nonmember based on the nonmember's consensual agreement with a 
tribal member). 
40. E.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374 (2001) (holding that tribal courts do not 
have jurisdiction over civil suits brought against state officers acting in their official 
capacity); Strate v. A-I Contractors, Inc., 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (concluding that tribal 
courts do not have jurisdiction over civil suits brought against nonmembers where the 
underlying incident took place on a state-controlled right-of-way inside of Indian 
Country); Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (adopting a presumptive rule that tribes do not 
have civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, absent two exceptions); Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (finding that tribes do not have criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians). See generally NEWTON ET AL., supra note 31, § 4.02[3) 
(pulling together case law and scholarly works to chronicle judicial limitations placed on 
tribal sovereignty in the civil and criminal contexts). 
41. See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial 
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 57 (1999) ("On 
their own terms, the [Court's) opinions congeal into an incoherent muddle."}; Getches, 
supra note 23, at 278-79 (characterizing the Court's approach to Indian law as improper 
subjectivism); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism 
of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1620-30 (1996) (same); Alex 
Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist 
Court: The Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 8-10 (2003) 
(blaming the antitribal decisions on the Court's failure to integrate its general federalism 
jurisprudence into Indian law). 
42. Frickey, supra note 23, at 436. 
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federal Indian law,,43 in Williams u. Lee.44 Williams served to 
legitimate the existence of tribal courts by denying state court 
jurisdiction over a small claims suit brought against a Navajo 
Nation member by a nonmember business operator doing 
business within the Navajo reservation.4s The Court's holding 
meant that nonmembers suing the tribe or tribal members must 
seek judicial relief in the tribe's courts, a critical decision in favor 
oftribal sovereignty, and a decision that guaranteed the future of 
tribal courtS.46 But in that case, a tribal member was the 
defendant in tribal court.47 It was a different question for the 
Court when a nonmember was the defendant or otherwise 
subject to a tribe's police powers.48 
In 1981, the Court articulated a general rule that Indian 
tribes have no civil jurisdiction over nonmembers-with two 
exceptions-in Montana u. United States.49 There the Court held 
that the authority of Indian tribes over the "'relations between an 
Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe'" has been implicitly 
divested as a function of a tribe's "'dependent status."'so In the 
criminal context, that implicit divestiture of tribal authority is 
absolute,S1 but in the civil context, there are two exceptions. First, 
"[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other 
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial 
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements."S2 Second, "[a] 
tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority 
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its 
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect 
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or 
welfare of the tribe."s3 
The Montana Court gave no underlying federal common law 
or public policy reasoning or justification for the general rule. 
The Court relied upon its decision in Oliphant u. Suquamish 
43. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAw 1 (1987). 
44. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
45. Id. at 223. 
46. See id. at 218, 223. 
47. Id.at217-18. 
48. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, Inc., 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997) (establishing that 
tribal courts have no jurisdiction over claims against nonmembers arising out of accidents 
on state highways located within tribal territory). 
49. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1981). 
50. See id. at 564 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978». 
51. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (finding 
tribal courts to possess no inherent jurisdiction in criminal suits against nonmembers). 
52. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. 
53. Id. at 566. 
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Indian Tribe-a case adopting a bright line rule that tribes may 
not exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers54-for the 
general principle that Indian tribes have no civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers either.55 Oliphant is one of the more notorious 
Supreme Court decisions in terms of its near-complete lack of 
plausible legal authority to support the Court's conclusion that 
Indian tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.56 
The Oliphant Court, in contrast to more recent Supreme Court 
cases discussing tribal sovereignty, gave little or no pragmatic or 
public policy reasoning for its decision.57 Instead, as Professor 
Charles Wilkinson suggested, the Justices voted on their "own 
visceral reaction" to the case.58 Professor Wilkinson did presage a 
pragmatic reason for the Court's reluctance to extend tribal 
54. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212. The Oliphant Court seemed to hold that tribes could 
not exercise criminal jurisdiction over any nonmembers-a conclusion confirmed by the 
Court in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990}-but the state of law now, after 
Congressional tinkering, is that tribes may exercise criminal jurisdiction over members 
and nonmember Indians. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197-98 (2004) ("[Sjoon 
after this Court decided Duro, Congress enacted new legislation specifically authorizing a 
tribe to prosecute Indian members of a different tribe."). 
55. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. The Court also cited Justice Johnson's 
concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck for the proposition that Indian tribes have no jurisdiction 
over nonmembers, but a careful review of the Fletcher opinion makes it clear that Justice 
Johnson said no such thing. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 143--48 (1810) (Johnson, J., 
concurring). 
56. The list of distinguished commentators that have criticized Justice Rehnquist's 
opinion on this ground includes, without limitation: T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, 
SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY 106-08 (2002) (calling the central reasoning behind 
Oliphant a "muddle" and "none-too-clear"); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 187-215 (1997) ("[ljt was the disingenuous 
methodology, the questionable historical arguments, and the unclear rationale used by 
Rehnquist to justify this opinion that were especially disquieting."); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, 
JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL 
HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 97-113 (2005) ("Oliphant, as written by Rehnquist, cites, 
quotes, and relies upon racist nineteenth-century beliefs and stereotypes ... ."); Russel 
Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609, 616-35 (1979) 
(describing Oliphant as a "failure of judicial craftsmanship"); Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie 
Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 PuB. LAND L. REV. 1, 11-16 
(1995) (citing Oliphant's significant impact despite its "flawed reasoning and 
unsubstantiated assertions"). 
57. Compare Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211-12 (finding no inherent power for tribal 
courts to prosecute and punish non-Indians), with Lara, 541 U.S. at 210 (recognizing an 
inherent power to prosecute nonmember Indians). 
58. WILKINSON, supra note 43, at 43. Quoting language out of context from a case 
called Ex parte Crow Dog, Justice Rehnquist implied that tribal courts would "'tr[y 
nonmembers), not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of their 
land, but by ... a different race, according to the law of a social state of which they have 
an imperfect conception ... .'" Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210-11 (quoting Ex parte Crow Dog, 
109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883)). Professor Rob Williams identified the missing language in the 
ellipses as referring to, among other things, Indians' "savage life" and "the red man's 
revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality." WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 56, at 109. 
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criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers-"civil liberties of United 
States citizens,,59-although the Court had rejected similar 
arguments before the Oliphant decision.60 
This reason for rejecting tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers 
has been labeled the "democratic deficit" by Dean T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff.61 Dean Aleinikoff suggests that the Court's concern 
goes further-nonmembers "cannot readily become voting 
members," in contrast to citizens who move from state to state.62 
This class of citizens is "permanently excluded from political 
participation. ,,63 These persons would not be in a position to 
participate in local politics, without the concomitant potential to 
seek a change in the law. There are three elements to the 
"democratic deficit"-Indian tribes, in general, do not allow 
nonmembers to "vote in tribal elections, run for tribal office, or 
serve on tribaljuries.',s4 But these elements are an illusion.65 
To borrow an old analogy, a resident and citizen of 
Colorado who defaults on a loan in Utah may be 
subject to the legal processes of Utah, even though 
she is not a citizen there. The Court focuses on the 
possibility that she has legal status sufficient to 
some day acquire citizenship in Utah, in contrast 
to a non-Indian who might not [have legal status to 
attain tribal membership]. But at the time the 
Colorado citizen's loan is adjudicated, she is not a 
citizen of Utah. Moreover, should the Colorado 
citizen move to Utah and become a citizen of Utah, 
her changed status could not alter the result the 
Utah courts' adjudication of her loan.66 
59. WILKINSON, supra note 43, at 43. 
60. See Richard B. Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 
54 WASH. L. REV. 479, 519 (1979) (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557-58 
(1975) (holding that respondents' non-Indian status did not preclude them from Tribal 
Counsel's authority to regulate the sale ofliquor), and Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 
(1959) ("The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian 
governments over their reservations.")). 
61. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 56, at 115. 
62. Id. at 116. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 115. 
65. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Legal Culture War Against Tribal Law, 2 
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REv. !hereinafter Legal Culture War] (forthcoming 2006) 
(manuscript at 9-11), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=882831 (characterizing the 
"so-called democratic deficit problem" as "an illusion"); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving 
Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, FED. LAw., Mar-Apr. 2006, at 38,40 (same); see 
also Frickey, supra note 23, at 466 (criticizing Justice Kennedy's approach as "question-
begging."). 
66. Legal Culture War, supra note 65, at 11. Thanks to Kristen Carpenter for 
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The Colorado citizen is in the same position she would be in if 
she were a non-Indian subject to the legal processes of a tribe. 
Her status as a nonmember, like her status as a nonresident of a 
state, makes no difference. 
In addition, the Court's worry about serving on juries is 
more than a little specious for two reasons. First, as Professor 
Kevin Washburn showed, federal prosecutors prosecute large 
numbers of reservation Indians in large cities, far from their 
"peers" on the reservation and in spite of the unfamiliar 
proceedings of federal courtS.67 Second, the Court's jurisprudence 
on tribal civil jurisdiction renders impotent tribal court attempts 
to compel nonmembers to respond to tribal jury summonses.68 
Assuming more tribes sought to expand nonmember rights to 
political participation as a means of showing the courts that 
there is no "democratic deficit," their ability to do so is 
hamstrung by the very doctrine to which they are attempting to 
respond. 
The Court, instead, seems to assume a particular view of 
tribal law-that tribal substantive law is not fair to 
nonmembers.69 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Duro v. 
Reina, a case where the Court held that Indian tribes had no 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians,70 states that the 
underlying reason for rejecting tribal court jurisdiction over 
nonmembers is that tribal courts "are influenced by the unique 
customs, languages, and usages of the tribes they serve. Tribal 
courts are often 'subordinate to the political branches of tribal 
governments,' and their legal methods may depend on 'unspoken 
practices and norms.',,71 The Court believes that tribal law is 
suggesting this analogy. 
67. See Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 709, 710-11 (2006) (discussing, among other things, the almost-foreign setting of 
such a proceeding); see also United States v. Nakai, 413 F.3d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that a venue transfer which may have reduced the number of Native 
Americans attending jury duty, "deprive[ing the defendant) of a fair representation of the 
community," did not violate the Sixth Amendment), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 593 (2005). 
68. Cf Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647-48 (2001) (holding that 
tribes may not tax nonmembers conducting business on non-Indian owned fee land within 
the Navajo Reservation). 
69. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693-94 (1990) (examining basic differences 
between tribal and federal courts, and finding the former to deny certain constitutional 
protections). 
70. See id. at 688. Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act in a successful 
attempt to overturn the result in Duro. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197-98 
(2004) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994)). 
71. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAw 334, 335 (1982)). 
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unfair to nonmembers.72 It is this line of reasoning, not the 
amorphous notion of the social contract, which drives the Court. 
Justice Souter's concurrence in Hicks, the first 
comprehensive attack on tribal law as applied to nonmembers, 
lays out the major thrust of the argument why substantive tribal 
law should not apply to nonmembers. He quotes two respected 
commentators on tribal common law for the proposition that the 
substantive law applied by tribal courts "would be unusually 
difficult for an outsider to sort out.'173 The first commentator, 
Dean Nell Jessup Newton, conducted one of the first empirical 
studies of tribal court common law decisionmaking.74 Justice 
Souter chose to highlight her observation that tribal courts 
"'ha[vel leeway in interpreting' the [Indian Civil Rights Act's 
(ICRA)] due process and equal protection clauses and 'need not 
follow the U.S. Supreme Court precedents' jot-for-jot.',,75 The 
second commentator, Ada Pecos Melton, had participated in one 
of the first serious and mainstream symposia regarding the 
importance of tribal courts in the federal system.76 Justice Souter 
quoted Ms. Melton for the proposition that "tribal law is still 
frequently unwritten, being based instead 'on the values, mores, 
and norms of a tribe and expressed in its customs, traditions, and 
practices,' and is often 'handed down orally or by example from 
one generation to another.",n Justice Souter then collapsed all 
forms and categories of tribal law into this summation: "The 
resulting law applicable in tribal courts is a complex 'mix of 
tribal codes and federal, state, and traditional law,' ... which 
would be unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out.'178 
72. Id. ("The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 provides some statutory guarantees of 
fair procedure, but these guarantees are not equivalent to their constitutional 
counterparts. "). 
73. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384-85 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring). 
74. Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian 
Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 290-91 (1998) (digesting eighty-five tribal court 
opinions, surveying their legal bases in the broader context of tribal and other 
jurisprudence). 
75. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Newton, supra note 74, 
at 344 & n.238). 
76. Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79 
JUDICATURE 126 (1995). Other participants and commentators included Yale law 
professor Judith Resnik, the then-United States Attorney General Janet Reno, the then-
Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit J. Clifford Wallace, and the then-Chief Justice of the 
Arizona Supreme Court Stanley G. Feldman. See Symposium, Indian Tribal Courts and 
Justice, 79 JUDICATURE 110 (1995). 
77. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Melton, supra note 76, at 
130-31). 
78. Id. at 384-85 (citation: omitted) (quoting NAT'L AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES 
AsS'N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE 43 (1978)). 
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Justice Souter erred when he combined all forms of "tribal 
law" into this "complex mix." As this Article will show, tribal law 
is not monolithic in the manner that Justice Souter suggests. A 
careful review of the article by Dean Newton shows that tribal 
courts decide their cases using Anglo-American common law 
more often than not.79 Perhaps more critical is that a careful 
review of Ms. Melton's article shows that her subject matter-
tribal customary and traditional law-applies only to members 
except where a nonmember expresses his or her consent to the 
proceedings (and also where the members consent to the 
presence of the nonmember).80 Justice Souter implied that the 
consequence of all this "difficult" tribal law is that nonmembers, 
or "outsider[s]" as he terms them, will suffer prejudice in their 
ability to adjudicate before tribal courts in accordance with tribal 
law.81 
Justice Souter's error is endemic to much on-the-ground 
tribal court practice involving nonmembers and their nonmember 
counsel. Few take the time to learn the law of Indian tribes. And, 
while it may be true that tribal common law is not as simple to 
discover as state or federal common law, "much of the 
information is acquired in the same way other legal education is 
acquired.,,82 Tribal common law often is available online and in 
79. See Newton, supra note 74, at 305 (commenting that of the cases surveyed, only 
a few were not decided based on state or federal common law). 
80. Perhaps the classic example of this arrangement is under the so-called "Duro 
fix," where Congress affirmed the inherent authority of Indian tribes to prosecute 
nonmember Indians in accordance with intertribal common law. See United States v. 
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197-98 (2004). Tribes could prosecute these consenting nonmember 
Indians in accordance with intratribal common law, although few if any have done so, 
because, in typical cases-if not the vast, vast majority of cases-the nonmember Indian 
has moved onto the reservation community through intermarriage or employment or 
other social arrangement. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal 
Members: The Impact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAw & SOC'y REV. 1123, 1143-44 
(1994) (discussing how such nonmembers have become part of the Indian community in a 
way that non-Indians cannot). 
81. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384-85. 
82. BORROWS, supra note 15, at 25. Moreover, Justice Steven's opinion in National 
Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, the case creating the tribal court 
exhaustion doctrine, stated that one benefit to requiring tribal court exhaustion before a 
federal court can review whether a tribal court has civil jurisdiction over nonmembers is 
that it "will encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting 
jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit of [tribal court) expertise 
in such matters in the event of further judicial review." See Nat1 Farmers Union Ins. Cos. 
v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985); see also FRANK POMMERSHEIM, 
BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAw AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 95 (1995) 
("The Court, without articulating and perhaps without even realizing it, appears to be 
gradually identifying the contours of the relationship of tribal courts to the federal 
system."). 
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published reporters.83 But, as any tribal court judge can attest, 
lawyers appearing in tribal courts every working day often refuse 
to learn tribal court rules or to seek out substantive tribal court 
decisions and tribal statutes.84 Justice Souter's opinion gives lazy 
attorneys an excuse to not prepare before appearing in (and 
thereby disrespecting) tribal courts. 
Moreover, Justice Souter's opmIOn assumes without 
discussion that tribal courts will always apply tribal law.85 
Practice in tribal courts suggests that tribal courts would, if 
asked, adopt a choice of law doctrine similar to the one followed 
by federal courts where they would apply nontribal law to decide 
questions involving nonmember rights.86 In other words, tribal 
courts would apply the substantive law of the jurisdiction with 
the most significant relationship to the underlying dispute.87 But 
tribal law, as should be expected, will be the choice of law in on-
reservation disputes. 
B. The Open Question Following Hicks 
Justice Souter's concurrence in Hicks is directed at a future 
case to be decided by the Court, addressing the question left open 
in Hicks and the case preceding it, Strate u. A-J Contractors-
"We leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over 
nonmember defendants in general.,,88 This open question may be 
one of the more fundamental questions for Indian tribes in the 
21st century. It is well-settled that Indian tribes have both 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over their own members.89 But, as 
83. See Tribal Court Clearinghouse, http://www.tribal-institute.orgllistsl 
tribaUaw.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) (providing, among other things, links to tribal 
courts, constitutions, laws, codes, and court decisions). 
84. See, e.g., J. Edythe Chenois, et aI., Just Like a "Real" Court, WASH. ST. BAR 
AsS'N NEWS, Nov. 2002, http://www.wsba.org/media/publicationslbarnewslarchivesl20021 
nov-02-real.htm (familiarizing attorneys with the modern tribal court and noting that 
"many attorneys do not have the opportunity to learn about how tribal courts work until" 
they find themselves there). 
85. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383--85 (Souter, J., concurring). 
86. Newton, supra note 74, at 300 & n.52. 
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAws § 6 (1971) (listing the 
applicable policies of interested states and the degree of interest of those states among 
several factors relevant to a court's choice oflaw decision); see also Joseph William Singer, 
A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731, 731-32 (1990) ("If more than one 
state has a real interest in the case, the courts should apply the law of the state that has 
the most significant relationship to the parties and the transaction or occurrence .... "). 
88. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358 n.2. 
89. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63-64 (1978) (citing the 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (lCRA) for its mandate that states may not have civil or 
criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country without tribal consent); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 
217, 220 (1959) ("[I]f the crime was by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that 
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Professor Wenona Singel noted, nonmembers pervade Indian 
Country: 
In reality, non-members participate in nearly all aspects of 
tribal life. They work as employees in both tribal business 
enterprises and tribal government. They live in tribal 
housing with their enrolled spouses, parents, or children. 
They participate in tribal commerce, stay as guests in tribal 
hotels, and travel through tribal lands. In addition, in many 
tribes, non-members participate in tribal government by 
serving as members of tribal boards, commissions, and 
judiciaries.9o 
A tribe's authority to regulate on-reservation nonmember 
conduct and a tribal court's authority to adjudicate the rights of 
nonmembers is fundamental to meaningful tribal self-
governance. 
The Members of the Roberts Court recognize that the 
Oliphant decision contained little or no pragmatic or public policy 
reasoning for why Indian tribes should not have criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers.91 Justice Kennedy attempted to 
provide a pragmatic public policy justification for protecting 
nonmembers from tribal court criminal jurisdiction92-the 
presumed unfairness of tribal substantive law-and Justice 
Souter's Hicks concurrence is an attempt to extend that logic to 
civil jurisdiction.93 While Justice Souter's argument has had a 
half-decade or more to settle, the Court awaits the next challenge 
to tribal court civil jurisdiction from a nonmember. A Supreme 
Court decision guided by the mistaken view of a monolithic tribal 
common law could be a disaster for Indian Country. Tribal 
sovereignty, a critical bulwark against the disintegration of tribal 
culture and traditions, would erode further. Tribal members 
would be forced to leave the reservation and their homes to seek 
civil relief against nonmembers, including tortfeasors, deadbeat 
dads, and every other nonmember liable to them. Tribal 
members, many of whom cannot afford legal representation in 
expressly conferred on other courts by Congress has remained exclusive."). 
90. Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal SelfGouernance, 80 N.D. L. REV. 
691, 714-15 (2004) (citations omitted). 
91. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205 (2004) (indicating that 
Congress has power to "modifY or adjust" status of tribes exercising authority over 
nonmembers); id. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that plenary authority of 
Congress over Indian tribes is inconsistent with notions oftribal sovereignty). 
92. Id. at 211-12 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
93. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 375 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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state and federal courts, often would be left without effective 
legal remedies.94 
III. A THEORY OF "INTERTRIBAL COMMON LAw" AND 
"INTRATRIBAL COMMON LAw" 
Tribal courts are not organic or Indigenous,95 but Indian 
tribes have made great strides in taking cultural and legal 
ownership of them. Indian tribes in the modern era of self-
determination and self-governance have adapted tribal courts, 
once tools of assimilating, "civiliz[ing]," and "educat[ing]" 
reservation Indians,96 to suit their own purposes and needs-and 
the purposes and needs of nonmembers. Tribal courts are now 
tools of adaptation, not assimilation. More than 250 Indian tribes 
have adopted tribal courts, and the rest have adopted one or 
more mechanisms of dispute resolution.97 And many tribal court 
systems include more than one type of court.98 Some courts 
mirror state and federal courts,99 while more traditional courts 
are more informal and rely upon traditional and customary 
procedure and practice. loo Some of these traditional courts 
operate under a system that rejects much of the adversarial 
system of adjudicating disputes. lol 
Though much has been written about the subject of tribal 
courts and tribal law, little is known. Scholars and commentators 
writing about tribal courts can differentiate without difficulty the 
procedures and infrastructure of tribal courts that mirror federal 
and state courts and those tribal courts that are based on 
94. See Gabriel S. Galanda, BAR NONE! The Social Impact of Testing Federal 
Indian Law on State Bar Exams, FED. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 30, 32 (citing an 
American Bar Association study published in 1994 which estimated that "only 20 percent 
of Indian peoples' legal needs are met"). 
95. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 113-20 (1983) (attributing the rise of Courts ofIndian Offenses to necessity). 
96. United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888). 
97. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE AsSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, PATHWAYS TO JUSTICE: BmLDING AND SUSTAINING TRIBAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEMS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 5-6 (2005). 
98. See Carey N. Vicenti, The Reemergence of Tribal Society and Traditional Justice 
Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 134, 139-41 (1995) (describing "five general categories" of 
developing tribal courts). 
99. E.g., Michael D. Petoskey, Tribal Courts, 67 MICH. B.J. 366, 367 (1988) (''These 
modern tribal courts have developed from adaptations of state and federal court 
systems."). 
100. E.g., Vicenti, supra note 98, at 141 ("Several Pueblos adjudicate transgressions 
and solve problems in accordance with age-old practices."). 
101. See Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in 
Indigenous Communities, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 229, 264-66 (2000) (discussing the 
"marked difference[sl" in Anglo-American and tribal courts). 
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customary and traditional methods of dispute resolution. lo2 But in 
the area of tribal law, scholars and commentators either ignore 
or do not differentiate between the substantive common law 
applied by the different courts. Discussion of the differences 
between these two categories of tribal common law, in fact, is 
necessary to preserve tribal cultures. 
This Article provides a rough theoretical framework for 
distinguishing between two very different categories of 
substantive tribal law as applied by tribal courts. Such work is 
necessary for the preservation of tribal law and culture. As 
Anishinaabe and Canadian legal scholar John Borrows wrote: 
[Tribal] legal traditions are strong and dynamic and can 
be interpreted flexibly to deal with the real issues in 
contemporary ... law concerning [Indian] communities. 
Tradition dies without such transmission and reception. 
Laying claim to a tradition requires work and imagination, 
as particular individuals interpret it, integrate it into their 
own experiences, and make it their own. In fact, tradition is 
altered by the very fact of trying to understand it. It is time 
that this effort to learn and communicate tradition be 
facilitated, both within [Indian tribes] and between [Indian 
tribes] and [other] courtS.103 
Borrows's statement serves as a template for the broader 
argument in favor of tribal sovereignty. Tribal sovereignty is not 
a claim to power and authority for their own sake, but a tool to 
preserve the culture and traditions of Indian people. lo4 Tribal 
sovereignty shields Indian people and Indian tribes from the 
assimilative effects of non-Indian society imposed through non-
Indian governmental control. 105 It follows that tribal law, as the 
manifestation of internal tribal sovereignty, should operate to 
reflect and preserve tribal culture and traditions. 
But tribal law serves more than one purpose. Tribal law also 
must allow Indian tribes to interact and survive in a political and 
legal world dominated by the United States and the various 
individual states. Tribal law can reduce the distance between the 
102. Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, 7 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 17,28 
(1997) (comparing and contrasting various aspects of Anglo-American and tribal courts). 
103. BORROWS, supra note 15, at 27 (footnote omitted). 
104. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 95, at 105-08 (discussing the challenges of 
modern efforts to reinvigorate tribal sovereignty while preserving customs and 
traditions). 
105. Cf Whitney Kerr, Giving up the "1": How the National Museum of the American 
Indian Appropriated Tribal Voices, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 423-25 (2004) ("In the 
hands of the federal government, tribes have lost their claims to individuality. In between 
attempts at obliteration, the federal government has shown a tendency to homogenize 
tribal culture."). 
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American economic, legal, and political arena. Substantive tribal 
common law reflects those two interests. 
A. Intertribal Common Law 
1. The Theory. "Intertribal common law" is the substantive 
common law applied by tribal courts in cases arising out of an 
Anglo-American legal construct. It is this Author's sense that the 
vast majority of tribal court cases arise out of an Anglo-American 
legal construct. Intertribal common law includes the common law 
decisions of other tribal courts and may include a tribal court's 
importation of federal and state court common law. Tribal courts 
create intertribal common law, for example, when litigants ask 
the court to interpret a statute such as the ICRA106 or a tribal 
secured transactions code. lo7 Tribal courts create intertribal 
common law when they adopt a common law rule of another 
tribal court or a federal or state court, such as the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. lOB 
An "Anglo-American legal construct" is any legal construct 
or relationship that has been imported into Indian Country, 
modeled upon a non-Indigenous legal construct.109 Tribal courts 
modeled on state and federal courts are Anglo-American legal 
constructs. Tribal constitutions modeled upon the "Model [Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA)] constitution"llo are Anglo-American 
legal constructs. Tribal housing leases, tribal employment 
contracts, tribal casino financing deals, tribal sovereign 
immunity, and common law tort, contract, and property law 
causes of action and defenses are all Anglo-American legal 
constructs. Indian tribes imported some of these constructs by 
choice, but outsiders imposed many others.lll As a function of 
106. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (2000). 
107. E.g., National Tribal Justice Resource Center, Secured Transactions Ordinance 
of the Bay Mills Indian Community, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ 
ccfolderlbmsecured.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). 
108. E.g., One Hundred Eight Employees of the Crow Tribe of Indians v. Crow Tribe 
of Indians, No. 89-320, at paras. 47-52 (Crow App. Ct. Nov. 21, 2001), available at 
http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinionsl2001.NACT.0000001.htm. (citing federal 
principles of sovereign immunity). 
109. For purposes of this Article, a "legal construct" is a legal concept or model. It 
may include, without limitation, a statute, a doctrine of common law, and legal or political 
infrastructure, such as a court, a governing body, and an executive agency. 
110. See Timothy W. Joranko & Mark C. Van Norman, Indian Self-Determination at 
Bay: Secretarial Autlwrity to Disapprove Tribal Constitutional Amendments, 29 GoNZ. L. 
REV. 81, 92-93 (1993) (describing often enacted model constitutions as "largely 
'boilerplate'" documents that frequently did not reflect tribal values). 
111. See id. at 82 ("In the 1880s, ... the United States shifted from dealing with 
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coexisting within non-Indian American society, some Indian 
tribes have taken these non-Indigenous constructs and made 
them, as much as possible, more consistent with tribal culture, 
while other communities have adopted them in haste or without 
detailed consideration as need arises. u2 At this point in history, 
where Indian tribes have begun to see success in their long 
struggle to preserve their cultures, economies, and even lives 
using the legal constructs available to them, U3 it is not possible or 
even desirable to expel all Anglo-American legal constructs from 
Indian Country.U4 
2. The Practice. Despite the dearth of theorization behind 
the use of intertribal common law, the wide majority of tribal 
courts apply intertribal common law in almost every decision 
involving nonmembers.u5 As the theory of intertribal common 
law suggests, tribal courts apply intertribal common law in a 
wide variety of tribal court cases, including drug-related civil 
forfeiture cases, contracts with nonmember businesses, and tort 
claims.u6 In Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. One Thousand Four 
Hundred Sixty Three Dollars and 14/100, for example, the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation Supreme Court upheld the authority of 
the tribal government to "regulate public safety through civil 
laws that restrict the possession, use or distribution of illegal 
drugs."u7 The statutes applied to the matter-the tribal 
legislature's codification of laws that prohibit the possession and 
use of certain drugs and the confiscation of property related to 
the possession and use of illegal drugsU8-were Anglo-American 
legal constructs. The federal common law that established the 
tribal government's exclusive jurisdiction over the casino parking 
lot where the tribal police found the drugs; the federal common 
law that established the Nation's authority to regulate the 
Indian nations as governments to dealing within Indian nations, ... [seeking) to destroy 
tribal governments through the forced assimilation oflndian people."). 
112. Id. at 93-94 (critiquing the widespread adoption of boilerplate constitutions and 
noting an increased desire among tribes to amend these constitutions to better reflect 
tribal values). 
113. See generally CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN 
INDIAN NATIONS 271-72, 330-38 (2005) (discussing legal and policy frameworks of 
modern Indian tribes, including tribal sovereignty and self-rule, and focusing particularly 
on tribes' efforts to establish casinos by using Anglo-American legal constructs such as 
litigation and congressional lobbying). 
114. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2000), the single 
most intrusive legal construct relating to tribal economic development, is also the most 
indispensable. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 
44 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=895900 
(examining federal interests in protecting Indian gaming rights and advancing a legal 
structure that will best apportion the resulting stream of revenue). 
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nonmembers' on-reservation actions; and the federal treaty 
reserving to the tribal government certain rights as against state 
and federal intrusion are all Anglo-American legal constructs.1l9 
Even the tribal police's actions were modeled upon American law 
enforcement tactics. 120 There's nothing wrong with the Nation's 
choices in this case-the drug ("crystal meth") came from outside 
the community, brought by nonmembers to the tribal casino, and 
so it is reasonable for the Nation to employ an outside legal 
construct in response. 121 Most tribal court cases-and almost all 
tribal cases that involve nonmembers in significant ways-do the 
same thing. 
When an Indian tribe engages in commercial business 
operations both on and off the reservation, the tribal courts 
resolving the disputes that arise out of these transactions employ 
intertribal common law to resolve them. Confederated Tribes of 
Grand Ronde v. Strategic Wealth Management, Inc. is a good 
example of a circumstance where tribal law adopted Anglo-
American legal constructs as a means of adaptation to modern 
transactional and business needs. 122 There, the Tribes brought 
suit in tribal court to vacate an arbitration panel's award of 
115. See, e.g., Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. One Thousand Four Hundred Sixty Three 
Dollars and 14/100, 32 Indian L. Rep. 6133,6134 (Muscogee (Creek) Nation Sup. Ct. Apr. 
29, 2005) (electing not to apply Title 14 of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation's code because the 
appellant was a non-Indian). 
116. See id. at 6133 (adjudicating a drug-related civil forfeiture case); see also 
Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde v. Strategic Wealth Mgmt., Inc., 32 Indian L. Rep. 
6148 (Confederated Tribes ofthe Grand Ronde Community of Or. Tribal Ct. Aug. 5, 2005) 
(examining agreements with nonmember businesses under federal and state law); 
Sullivan v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 32 Indian L. Rep. 6128 (Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribal Ct. May 31, 2005) (reviewing a tort claims case under state common law 
standards). 
117. See Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 32 Indian L. Rep. at 6133,6135. 
118. See id. at 6133-34 (citing 14 MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION CODE ANN. § 2-101(1) 
and 22 MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION CODE ANN. § 2-101(9». 
119. See id. (citing, among other authorities, 27 MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION CODE 
ANN. § 1-102(A) (defining territorial jurisdiction limits), 27 MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION 
CODE ANN. § 1-102(B) (defining civil jurisdiction limits), Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (l980) (noting tribes' broad range 
of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations), and Indian Country v. Oklahoma, 
829 F.2d 967,971 (lOth Cir. 1987) (holding as a matter offederallaw that the same tract 
of land and gaming facility where the criminal acts addressed in Muscogee (Creek) Nation 
v. One Thousand Four Hundred Sixty Three Dollars and 141100 took place are part of the 
original treaty lands held by the Nation and subject to the civil authority of the Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation». 
120. See id. at 6133. 
121. [d. at 6133. 
122. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde v. Strategic Wealth Mgmt., Inc., 32 Indian 
L. Rep. 6148 (Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Or. Tribal Ct. Aug. 
5,2005). 
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attorney fees and costs to the Tribes' former business partners, 
Strategic Wealth Management (SWM) and Paradigm Financial 
Services, Inc. (Paradigm), nonmember-owned businesses.123 The 
tribal court granted the relief because the Tribe "did not waive its 
sovereign immunity in any of the agreements it entered into with 
[SWM] ."124 The underlying contract (a contract relating to 
financial and investment services) and the arbitration clause, 
coupled with its incorporation of tribal sovereign immunity, were 
all Anglo-American legal constructs utilized by the Tribes. 125 The 
tribal code provisions establishing subject matter jurisdiction 
mirrored federal rules in significant ways.126 The federal common 
law allowing for tribal court jurisdiction over the nonmembers 
and the defenses raised by SWM were all Anglo-American legal 
constructs. 127 The tribal court relied upon its own authority for 
the background policy relating to tribal sovereign immunit/28 
and many federal court cases for much of the remainder of the 
issues. All of this was intertribal common law. 
Strategic Wealth Management is the perfect example of how 
tribal law is fair. Patrick Sizemore, president of SWM, and Mark 
Sizemore, president of Paradigm, were brothers who worked for 
years in Indian Country, tailoring their businesses to tribal 
clients.129 They represented themselves and their businesses as 
being able to bridge the gap between on-reservation tribal capital 
and off-reservation business investment opportunities--experts 
in both finance and investment, and in relevant federal Indian 
law.130 The question of tribal sovereign immunity should not have 
been a surprise when they negotiated their contract with the 
Tribes. 
123. Id. at 6148. 
124. Id. at 6155. 
125. See id. at 6148-49 (citing the contract and arbitration clauses and describing 
the arbitration proceedings); id. at 6152 (citing, among other authorities, Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) and Guardipee v. Confederated Tribes of 
Grand Ronde, 19 Indian L. Rep 6111, 6111 (Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde 
Community of Or. Tribal Ct. June 11, 1992), for the proposition that the Tribes retained 
immunity from suit}. 
126. See id. at 6148-51 (citing TRIBAL COURT ORDINANCE § 31O(d)(1}(A}}. 
127. See id. at 6150-51 (citing, among other authorities, Strate v. A-I Contractors, 
Inc., 520 U.S. 438 (1997), Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 
U.S. 845 (1985), and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)); see also id. at 6154-
55 (examining the applicability of the Anglo-American waiver, res judicata, and 
justiciability defenses). 
128. See id. at 6152 (citing Guardipee, 19 Indian L. Rep at 6111). 
129. The Author became familiar with SWM during his experience as in-house 
counsel for the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona in 1998 and 1999. 
130. See Strategic Wealth Mgmt., Inc., 32 Indian L. Rep. at 6148. 
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Tribal courts also decide tort and contract claims brought 
against Indian tribes, tribal government officials, and tribal 
entities using intertribal common law. Many student 
commentators, and even the Supreme Court,l3l have criticized 
tribal sovereign immunity as a tool whereby tribal defendants 
avoid liability,132 but the on-the-ground reality defies 
conventional wisdom. Tribal defendants often waive their 
. 't 133 Immunl y. 
Moreover, they are insured, either in accordance with tribal 
or federal law.134 Modern tribal court cases adjudicating tort 
claims often do so with nonmember-owned insurance companies 
as parties. Lee v. Little Lodge Headstart l35 and Sullivan v. 
Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprisel36 are instructive. Lee 
exemplifies the reality of a tribal government's tort liability when 
operating governmental services funded in part by federal 
funds. 137 Federal law mandates that the tribal government and 
its entities acquire adequate insurance and further mandates 
that the insurance carrier not invoke tribal sovereign 
immunity.13s The Lee Court held that the tribal defendant was 
entitled to a dismissal of the claims brought against it on the 
basis that it retained immunity from suit but declined to dismiss 
the tribal entity's insurance carrier.139 
131. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998). 
132. E.g., Brian C. Lake, Note, The Unlimited Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribal 
Businesses Operating Outside the Reservation: An Idea Whose Time Has Gone, 1996 
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 87, 88 (1996) (citing unawareness and involuntary assumption ofthe 
risk as two fundamental problems of extending unlimited sovereign immunity to off· 
reservation tribal businesses). 
133. See R. Spencer Clift, III, The Historical Development of American Indian Tribes; 
Their Recent Dramatic Commercial Advancement; and a Discussion of the Eligibility of 
Indian Tribes Under the Bankruptcy Code and Related Matters, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
177, 180 (2003) ("[Als a practical matter and business decision [tribes will 
oftentimesl ... waive sovereign immunity in certain legal fora in order to garner 
valuable ... commercial interaction with the private and public sectors."). 
134. Thomas P. Schlosser, Sovereign Immunity: Should the Sovereign Control the 
Purse?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 309, 336, 340-41 (2000). 
135. Lee v. Little Lodge Headstart Program, No. 02C-0366 (Three Affiliated Tribes of 
the Fort Berthold Reservation Dist. Ct. Nov. 1, 2004) (on file with Author). 
136. Sullivan v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 32 Indian L. Rep. 6128 
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. May 31, 2005). 
137. See Lee, No. 02C-0366, at 8. 
138. 25 U.S.C. § 450ftc) (2000). 
139. See Lee, No. 02C-0366, at 7-12. The Court relied upon the common law of 
federal and state courts, as well as other tribal courts, to conclude that the Little Lodge 
Headstart Program was entitled to raise sovereign immunity. See id. at 5 (citing, among 
other authorities, Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 
U.S. 505 (1991); Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 280 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Clement 
v. LeCompte, 22 Indian L. Rep. 6111 (Cheyenne River Tribal Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1994); 
Davis v. Mille Lacs Band, No. 96 CV 701 (Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians Tribal Ct. 
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The Sullivan case demonstrates how tribal sovereign 
immunity operates when the tribal defendant is a tribal business 
enterprise.140 The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation waived its 
immunity from suit arising out of claims made by its gaming and 
resort enterprise patrons. l4l The Nation waived its immunity for 
damage awards not exceeding "actual damages" and for pain and 
suffering not exceeding "100% of the actual damages 
sustained."142 Sullivan is an uncomplicated case whereby the 
court took evidence and heard testimony regarding an accident 
that occurred at the Foxwoods casino.143 Both Lee and Sullivan 
involved nonmembers and were resolved by a tribal court 
applying intertribal common law. Likely for business reasons, the 
tribal court applied Anglo-American versions of tort law to the 
claims of nonmembers. 
All four of these cases-and there are many, many more 
with similar patterns-involved nonmembers and the application 
by tribal courts of intertribal common law to resolve these 
disputes.144 Tribal courts will resolve tort claims involving 
nonmembers as an Anglo-American legal construct using 
intertribal common law.145 The same is true for sovereign 
immunity and the analysis undertaken by the Sullivan court for 
determining the tort claimant's "actual damages.,,146 
The Sullivan opinion demonstrates how tribal courts have 
developed in the last three decades. The tribal court relied upon its 
own precedent in most instances, citing to Connecticut law or 
American legal treatises where its own common law was silent.147 
Sept. 30, 1996». 
140. Sullivan, 32 Indian L. Rep. at 6128. 
141. See David D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Can a Sovereign Protect Investors 
from Itself? Tribal Institutions to Spur Reservation Investment, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
Bus. L. 173, 194-95 & n.101 (2004) (citing Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, TRIBAL 
LAwS AND RULES OF COURT tit. N (2001), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/mpequot1.htm#title4 (last visited Sept. 21, 
2006». 
142. Sullivan, 32 Indian L. Rep. at 6130 (quoting Mashantucket Pequot Tribal 
Nation, TRIBAL LAws AND RULES OF COURT tit. N, ch. 1, § 4(a), (d) (2001)). 
143. See id. at 6129-32 (applying state common law to resolve a tort claim). 
144. Id. at 6128, 6130-31; Lee, No. 02C·0366, at 1-2 (Three Affiliated Tribes of the 
Fort Berthold Reservation Dist. Ct. Nov. 1, 2004) (on file with Author); Muscogee (Creek) 
Nation v. One Thousand Four Hundred Sixty Three Dollars and 141100, 32 Indian L. Rep. 
6133, 6134 (Muscogee (Creek) Nation Sup. Ct. Apr. 29, 2005); Confederated Tribes of 
Grand Ronde v. Strategic Wealth Mgmt., Inc., 32 Indian L. Rep. 6148, 6150 (Confederated 
Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community. of Or. Tribal Ct. Aug. 5, 2005). 
145. See Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 11, at 552 ("One Pueblo told us 
that ... pain and suffering are not compensated in tribal law [-I 'You live with it ... .'"). 
146. See Sullivan, 32 Indian L. Rep. at 6129-32. 
147. Id. 
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As tribal courts hear more and more cases, they will be more 
capable of relying upon their own precedents, rather than importing 
federal, state, and other tribal court decisions. This exemplifies the 
ongoing process of tribal courts adapting Anglo-American common 
law in cases involving nonmembers. The oldest tribal courts of 
record adopted and imported Anglo-American precedents for use in 
cases involving nonmembers.148 The next generation does the same, 
but also relies upon the precedents of older generations of tribal 
COurtS.149 The process suggests that importation and adaptation of 
Anglo-American common law is useful for tribal courts when 
resolving disputes involving nonmembers-and that this process 
will continue. 
Intertribal common law is a mixture of tribal common law, as 
well as the common law decisions of other tribal courts, federal 
courts, and state courts. While there is a definite mixture of 
authorities, there is no instance where a tribal court has chosen to 
depart in an unusual manner from the established common law of 
other jurisdictions once adopted. In short, it is unusual to find a 
tribal court decision involving nonmembers that would depart in a 
radical manner from the way a state or federal court would decide 
the case. If the Supreme Court is concerned about the unfairness of 
tribal substantive law as it applies to nonmembers, it need not 
worry. 
Take "due process," for example, the area of law Justice Souter 
pounced on. ISO Dean Newton stated that tribal courts do not follow 
state and federal precedent 'jot-for-jot," but that sounds much 
worse than it is. Dean Newton would agree that tribal courts' 
interpretations are well within the parameters of the due process 
that state and federal courts apply. 151 Due process is one of the more 
subjective legal doctrines in the law.152 State and federal courts tend 
to apply a balancing test,153 reaching results that differ from other 
148. Id. at 6129-30. 
149. Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of 
Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Part I), 46 AM. J. COMPo L. 287, 327 (1998) 
(indicating the importance of institutional memory among tribal judges). 
150. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring). 
151. Cf. Newton, supra note 74, at 297 ("[S)tudents and scholars approaching tribal 
court opinions with respect for the tribal context would not automatically criticize 
deviations from state or federal law, but would understand that difference does not 
always mean inferiority."). 
152. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (calling the 
"guideposts" for substantive due process decisionmaking "scarce and openended" (quoting 
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))). 
153. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (creating a test for due 
process cases that balances three factors: (1) private interest affected; (2) risk of erroneous 
deprivation; and (3) government interests). 
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courts in often dramatic ways. A California resident and citizen, 
where the notion of "substantive due process" is incorporated into 
the state's constitutional law/54 might be subject to a U.S. Supreme 
Court still cringing from its own substantive due process 
jurisprudence.155 Due process as envisioned by the framers of the 
Constitution might be nothing like the due process the Court now 
applies.156 Why should Justice Souter hold Indian tribes to a ')ot-for-
jot" standard when the Court does not (and cannot) hold state and 
federal courts to the same standard?157 While the Rosebud Sioux 
tribal court might not apply due process the same way as the Little 
River Band of Ottawa Indians tribal court, they might apply the 
doctrine the same as Idaho, South Dakota, or Michigan courtS.15S In 
fact, the Court's own due process jurisprudence has built-in 
expectations of variation.159 
As tribal courts decide more cases, they will have more 
opportunity to rethink these common law choices, just as federal 
and state courts rethink their own common law choices. Every 
Indian tribe is a laboratory for innovation.160 Every court may live 
by Justice Holmes's dictum: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than 
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still 
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down 
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from 
blind imitation of the past.16I 
154. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
155. E.g., ColI. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 690-91 (1999) (finding the expanding due process approach a distasteful tool for 
achieving legislative flexibility); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
861-64 (1992) (justifying a malleable view of due process based on changing 
understandings of facts over time). 
156. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 15-38 (2005) (describing the 
Constitution as a "continuing instrument" of government that will apply to changing 
subject matter). 
157. Compare Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 901 (Idaho 1982) (advancing full 
faith and credit to tribal court orders and judgments), with In re Marriage of Red Fox, 542 
P.2d 918, 920 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (applying rules of comity, not full faith and credit, to 
tribal court orders and judgments). 
158. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 80-81 
(1930) (holding that states may adopt differing types of appeals processes without 
violating the due process clause). 
159. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). 
160. C{. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."). 
161. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
167, 187 (1920). 
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Over time, tribal courts may incorporate the necessary 
custom and tradition-and stories-of the tribal community into 
its own common law. This incorporation must be gradual, but it 
is a must if the tribal common law is to have value for the 
community. 
B. Intratribal Common Law 
1. The Theory. "Intratribal common law" is the common 
law applied by tribal courts in cases arising out of an Indigenous 
legal construct. 162 Intratribal common law, in a normative sense, 
should be the law that a tribal court would apply, a law that 
relies on tribal custom and traditional law and norms. Intratribal 
common law also may be the "law" that traditional or 
nonadversarial tribal courts, such as peacemaker courts, use to 
resolve disputes. 163 In a practical sense, however, many tribes 
have not yet recovered their customs and traditions in a manner 
that is useful in this regard. Regardless, cases resolved using 
intratribal common law tend to involve tribal members to the 
exclusion of all others, with the exception of nonmember Indians 
and nonmembers who consent to the application of intratribal 
common law. 
An "Indigenous legal construct," in contrast to an "Anglo-
American legal construct," is a legal construct that originates 
within the tribal community. The form of government that a 
tribal community chooses may be indigenous in origin, such as 
the so-called "theocratic" government of many of the Pueblos in 
the desert southwest. 164 The canoe ownership traditions of the 
Pacific Northwest tribes, handed down from generation to 
generation, originated from within the community.165 The 
inheritance rules of a community, whether they are matrilineal, 
patrilineal, or neither, tend to originate from within the 
community.166 Any legal construct not imposed or imported from 
the non-Indian political communities should be classified as an 
Indigenous legal construct. 
162. See, e.g., Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 225, 229-30 (1989) (examining applicable law in Navajo tribal courts and 
characterizing the law as Navajo "customary," or common, law). 
163. [d. at 230. 
164. See JOHN R. WUNDER, "RETAINED By THE PEOPLE": A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
INDIANS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 10-11 (1994); Angela R. Riley, Sovereignty and 
Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 15, on file with Author). 
165. See VINE DELORIA, JR., INDIANS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 32-33 (1977). 
166. See Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PuB. 
POL'y 97,97-98 (2004) (describing the origins of various traditions of Pueblos). 
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Applying intratribal common law-in cases involving 
members and the tribe-to the exclusion of the laws of 
nonmember communities should be the goal of all tribal courts, 
but it may be a goal that is slow in coming. Discovering the 
tribe's customs and traditions-and the tribe's stories-may take 
time. Learning how these customs and traditions apply to the 
decisionmaking analyses of tribal courts may take even longer. 
But it is a worthy and necessary goal. As it stands right now in 
many tribal jurisdictions, tribal courts decide disputes between 
members with reference to federal and state law more often than 
not. lG7 Professor Kevin Washburn wrote that, in the area of 
criminal law, for example, imported federal and state criminal 
laws and law and order codes do not match with tribal cultures.lGS 
Professor Washburn argues that a tribal community "defines 
what it values and what it abhors" in enacting criminal laws.lG9 
Tribal communities that import state and federal criminal laws 
into Indian Country do so at a great risk to the preservation of 
community norms and culture. 
Intratribal common law is the heart of the intersection of 
tribal law and culture. As noted by Professor Christine Zuni 
Cruz, tribal courts that do not apply custom and tradition in this 
context, relying instead on federal and state law, 
"participate ... in their own ethnocide.,,170 Here is where Indian 
tribes and Indian people reach back into the past to relearn the 
old stories, to learn what it means to be Indian, and to learn how 
Indian people resolve these kinds of internal disputes. l7l For 
example, although federal Indian law and policy has depleted 
much of Indian Country, a great deal remains undisturbed.172 
Intratribal common law is strongest in these places. Here is 
where Indian people, Indian tribes, and tribal courts take what 
they can from custom and tradition and apply it to the disputes 
of today, to the extent that they differ from the disputes of the 
past. Here, then, is the other part of tribal common law, a part 
167. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Putting the Tribe in Tribal Courts: Possible? 
Desirable?, 8 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POLY 74, 94-95 (1999) (analyzing sources of law relied 
upon by tribal courts in 359 cases published in the Indian Law Reporter). 
168. See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 
84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 836-37 (2006) (stating that the Major Crimes Act, enacted by 
Congress in 1885, has led to a situation in which "a community alien and external to the 
tribal communities" has defined criminal offenses for the tribes). 
169. Id. at 834. 
170. Zuni, supra note 102, at 24. 
171. See id. at 26 ("The sources of common law are the members of tribal society who 
were raised traditionally."). 
172. See id. at 27 ("Individual tribes face the challenge to develop an indigenous 
system[;l ... in the face of imposed mandates ... the spirit of resistance is alive."). 
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that exists parallel to intertribal common law and that tribal 
courts apply in specific and relevant contexts--contexts not 
including nonmembers. 
2. The Practice. The classic example of the use of 
intra tribal common law is where a dispute arises between two 
members (or the tribe) involving tribal lands with "spiritual 
significance to the group.,,173 In some Indian communities, the 
location of the land may not be disclosed, nor may the law that 
would decide the dispute. 174 These disputes touch members to the 
exclusion of all nonmembers by definition. But most disputes 
arising out of Indigenous legal constructs may be discussed in 
some manner, although published tribal court opinions relating 
to the disputes may be difficult to locate. 
Part of the theory of intratribal common law is discovering 
the relevant customs and traditions of an Indian community. 
While many scholars have located and published the customs 
and traditions of several tribal communities,175 most tribes have 
not had the benefit of this kind of scholarship. The relevant 
stories are yet to be discovered. 176 But there are a few tribal 
court cases that exemplify the application of intratribal common 
law. 
Tribal courts decide family law cases involving members 
(and even nonmembers who consent) using intratribal common 
law. Polingyouma v. Laban is a case that recites customary and 
traditional law before applying that law to modern Hopi life. 177 
173. Newton, supra note 74, at 306 n.71. 
174. See id. at 306 & n.71 (noting a property claim on land with spiritual significance 
and within a tribe's ancient land). 
175. E.g., GEORGE COPWAY, THE TRADITIONAL HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTIC 
SKETCHES OF THE OJIBWAY NATION v, ix-x (1850) (providing "a sketch of [Ojibway] 
[N]ation's history, describing its home, its country, and its peculiarities"); LLEWELLYN & 
HOEBEL, supra note 13, at vii-viii (explaining that the authors have "aimed at the 
development of a social science instrument for the recording and interpretation of law-
ways among ... the Cheyennes"); MARy SHEPARDSON, NAVAJO WAYS IN GoVERNMENT 3-4 
(1963) (advancing a "functional analysis of Navajo politics against a background of the 
main historical events ... and a sketch of Navajo economy and traditional Navajo social 
structure"); STRICKLAND, supra note 15, at xi-xii (studying the Cherokees who were 
moved from Georgia to Oklahoma in 1838 and 1839); Steven M. Karr, Now We Have 
Forgotten the Old Indian Law: Clwctaw Culture and the Evolution of Corporal 
Punishment, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV .. ~09, 409, 410 n.2 (1999) (discussing the Choctaw, 
Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole cultures); Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From 
It": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175, 175-76 (1994) (reviewing the character 
of "Navajo justice" and comparing it to Anglo law). 
176. See BORROWS, supra note 15, at 25-26 ("IM]uch of the information is 
acquired ... through years of study and hard work. "). 
177. Polingyouma v. Laban, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6227, 6228 (Hopi Tribe App. Ct. Mar. 
28,1997). 
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The case involved an appeal of a child custody decision reached 
at the trial court level whereby the trial court decided to award 
equal periods of physical custody to both parents.178 The appellate 
court took judicial notice of "three aspects of Hopi custom 
concerning children. Under traditional Hopi practice, a child is 
born into her mother's clan, lives with the mother's household 
and receives ceremonial training from the mother's household.,,179 
The court then "tested" the custom "for relevancy ... in the 
context of modern Hopi life.,,180 Hopi custom seemed to imply that 
the mother should have retained full custody. To uphold the trial 
court's order, however, the court relied upon the fact that the 
parents wanted the child to remain in Hopi Day School at Hopi 
and the representation by the father that he would relocate to 
Hopi to avoid disrupting the child's education.18l Anglo-American 
courts would not have considered custom and tradition at all, let 
alone this particular Hopi custom. Polingyouma was a case 
involving members engaged in a family dispute. The tribal court 
should and did apply intratribal common law to resolve the 
dispute. 
Disputes between members over rights to tribal lands are 
another type of case best decided in accordance with intratribal 
common law. Ross v. SUlU 182 was a case arising out of a dispute 
over claims to land within the Hopi reservation by different clans 
at the First Mesa. 183 The Hopi Constitution provided that the 
local village there, the Village of First Mesa, had "the power to 
assign farming land."184 The Hopi intratribal common law 
provided that each village had the discretion to adopt modern, or 
Anglo-American-style, governmental structures, but unless they 
did so, "they [were] considered as being under the traditional 
Hopi organization.,,185 "The Village of First Mesa [had] not 
adopted a village constitution .... [and] therefore, remain [ed] 
under the traditional[, intratribal, law] .... "186 The Hopi 
appellate court ruled that the lower court could not have 
178. See id. 
179. [d. 
180. [d. 
181. See id. 




183. See id. at 1. 
184. [d. at 4-5 (citing HOPI CONST., available at http://www.ntjrc.org/ccfoider/ 
hopi30nst.htm (last visited Sept. 21,2006)). 
185. [d. at 5-6. 
186. See id. at 6. 
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exercised jurisdiction in the dispute at issue in Sulu. ls7 Hopi law 
allows for traditional villages to resolve certain disputes over 
land exclusive of tribal court jurisdiction. ISS Sulu exemplifies a 
case involving disputes between tribal members to the exclusion 
of all others. Under Hopi law, it was appropriate to resolve the 
dispute utilizing intratribal law. In that instance, the relevant 
intratribal law even precluded the tribal court from exercising 
jurisdiction over the matter. 
Tribal government disputes and constitutional law questions 
are another area where tribal courts can and should apply 
intratribal common law. Here, tribal courts are confronted with 
tribal governments that are Anglo-American legal constructs; 
that is, the federal government more often than not imposed a 
form of government on the tribe based on outside models such as 
municipal governments or the federal government structure. IS9 
The form a tribal government takes is a decision that originates 
from within, in theory, but most tribal governments mirror 
Anglo-American governmental structures in important respects. 
In these cases, tribal courts adapt intertribal common law and 
apply the modified laws as intratribal common law. 190 Again, 
because these cases are wholly tribal, nonmember rights are not 
implicated. Certified Question II: Navajo Nation v. MacDonald 
exemplifies this adaptation of intertribal common law in a tribal 
governmental dispute. 191 The relevant question presented was 
whether the Navajo Tribal Council had authority to place the 
187. See id. (explaining that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over an "intravillage 
dispute between clans over a matter reserved for village decision"). 
188. See id. at 6-7. 
189. See NEWTON ET AL, supra note 31, § 4.06[21 [a1 (identifYing that under the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA), Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior's involvement 
in tribal governmental matters, including elections and constitutional amendments). In 
many cases, the Secretary of Interior's authority to disapprove new tribal constitutions 
impeded the discretion of tribes to form an organic tribal government structure. See 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Insidious Colonialism of the Conqueror: The Federal 
Government in Modern Tribal Affairs, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 273, 279 (2005) ("[T1his 
requirement allows the federal government to decide elemental questions of tribal law 
that should be decided by the tribe alone."); Joranko & Van Norman, supra note 110, at 
84 ("By continuing secretarial review of IRA tribal constitutions, Congress left in place a 
significant obstacle to true Indian self-determination."). 
190. See, e.g., Turtle Mountain Judicial Bd. v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa 
Indians, No. 04-1126, at 5 (Turtle Mountain Tribal App. Ct. 2005), http://www.turtle-
mountain.cc.nd.uslpp_casesl20053aseslJudicial%20Board%20v%2OTMB%200pinion.doc 
(drawing upon federal and other tribes' common law where the tribe's common law was 
silent); Snowden v. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich., 32 Indian L. Rep. 6047, 
6050 (Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Mich. App. Ct. Jan. 7, 2005) (same). 
191. Certified Question II: Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6086, 
6087 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Apr. 13, 1989) (stating that a Navajo statute governs when the 
Navajo Tribal Council may remove a probationary judge). 
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tribal chairman on administrative leave pending an investigation 
into alleged criminal activity. 192 The Nation has no written 
constitution,193 so the tribal court adapted intertribal common law 
to resolve the dispute.194 The court relied upon the fact that the 
chairman's authority was derived in all respects from acts and 
delegations of the tribal council. I95 The court implied from that 
reality that the tribal council also retained the authority to 
"withdraw, limit, or supervise the exercise of powers it has 
bestowed on the offices of Chairman.,,196 From that holding, the 
Court concluded the tribal council could place the Chairman on 
administrative leave. 197 The Navajo court began its analysis with 
the Secretarial regulations creating the Navajo government 
structures, which are, of course, Anglo-American structures. But 
the court stayed away from blind reliance upon federal and state 
law common law precedents. It was, after all, an internal matter 
to be decided, as much as possible, by intratribal common law. 
The practice of applying intratribal common law establishes 
that there can be a clear line delineating between the laws that 
may be used to resolve disputes between members and tribal 
entities, and those disputes whose subject matters arise out of 
Indigenous legal constructs. Nonmembers, unless they consent 
and the community consents, are not affected by intratriballaw. 
IV. TOWARD RECOGNITION OF TRIBAL COURT CIVIL JURISDICTION 
OVER NONMEMBERS 
The development and theorization of intertribal and 
intratribal common law may assist Indian tribes and their 
advocates in educating the federal judiciary of the on-the-ground 
reality of tribal court civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. To be 
certain, there appears to be a great deal of apprehension 
emanating from the Court about the possibility of this 
nonconsensual exercise of jurisdiction, but a little education may 
go a long way. 
192. See id. at 6090. 
193. See DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 429 (5th ed. 2005). 
194. While the court relied upon intratribal common law, it should be noted that the 
chairman's office and the Tribal Council, created by regulations promulgated by the 
Department of Interior, were both Anglo-American legal constructs. See MacDonald, 16 
Indian L. Rep. at 6090. 
195. See id. at 6091. 
196. [d. 
197. See id. at 6092 ("The Navajo Tribal Council can place a Chairman or Vice 
Chairman on administrative leave with pay if they have reasonable grounds to believe 
that the official seriously breached his fiduciary trust to the Navajo people .... "). 
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A. Correcting the Misunderstanding 
Cases where nonmembers challenge the jurisdiction of tribal 
courts are consistent with a theory differentiating between 
intertribal and intratribal common law. The recent case, Smith v. 
Salish Kootenai College,t98 is a typical tribal court case involving 
a nonmember.199 Victims of an auto accident on the Flathead 
Indian Reservation sued the nonmember in tribal court in a 
wrongful death action.20o The nonmember then filed a cross-claim 
against his co-defendant, also in tribal court.201 Mter losing at 
trial, the nonmember sought to challenge tribal court jurisdiction 
in federal court.202 
Smith involved the tribal court's application of intertribal 
common law. Wrongful death is an Anglo-American legal 
construct, and the tribal court applied, as tribal statutory law 
required, Anglo-American common law in instructing the jury on 
negligence as embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.203 
The nonmember's first argument on appeal before the tribal 
appellate court involved the best evidence rule, another Anglo-
American legal construct.204 The nonmember's final argument on 
appeal before the tribal appellate court was an attempt to 
convince the court to reject the American common law rule that 
evidence concerning the insurance coverage of the parties is 
inadmissible, as stated in Federal Rule of Evidence 411.205 The 
tribal appellate court affirmed the tribal court's refusal to allow 
the nonmember to question witnesses and jurors about 
insurance.206 Like so many other tribal court cases, this case did 
198. Smith v. Salish Kootenai ColI., 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
199. Many tribal court cases involving nonmembers as defendants, where the 
nonmember contests jurisdiction, are tort claims. E.g., Strate v. A-I Contractors, Inc., 520 
U.S. 438 (1997) (reviewing a personal injury action); Allstate Indem. Co. v. Stump, 191 
F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (evaluating jurisdictional issues related to an insurance claim 
arising from tortious conduct). 
200. Smith, 434 F.3d at 1129. 
201. [d.; see also Smith v. Salish Kootenai ColI., No. AP-99-227-CV, at 1-4 
(Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes App. Ct. 2003), available at 
http://www.umt.edullawinsider/libraryltribaVcs&klopinionsiSmithSKC.pdf. 
202. See Smith, 434 F.3d at 1129-30. 
203. See Smith, No. AP-99-227-CV at 10-11 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 874A cmt. e (1977»; Laws ofthe Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes § 4-1-104 
(2003), http://www.umt.edullawinsider/library/tribaVcs&klcode2003/intro.pdf#search=%22 
%22Laws%20of%20the%20Confederated%20Salish%20and%20Kootenai%20Tribes% 
22%22 (instructing tribal courts to first apply intra tribal law and then to apply applicable 
federal law). 
204. See Smith, No. AP-99-227-CV at 5-7. 
205. See id. at 13-14 (citing FED. R. EVID. 411). 
206. See id. at 14. 
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not involve the kind of law that would tend to confuse 
nonmembers. If anything, in an attempt to bring evidence about 
insurance before the jury, the nonmember defendant attempted 
to exploit the fact that state and federal law is not controlling in 
tribal court decisions by questioning witnesses and jurors about 
insurance. From beginning to end, this case involved Anglo-
American legal constructs and state and federal common law 
interpreted by a tribal court. There was no unfairness to that 
nonmember litigant-the tribal court decided the case the same 
way a state or federal court would have. 
Empirical studies of tribal court decisions involving 
nonmembers confirm the result in Smith. Dean Newton 
characterizes Middlemist u. Member of the Tribal Council of the 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 207 a case involving the 
challenge to tribal regulatory jurisdiction brought by nonmember 
irrigation districts, as a "striking example of sensitivity to tribal 
traditions,,,208 but the result in the case mirrored the result that 
the nonmembers would have achieved in state or federal courtS.209 
Dean Newton reviewed as many as thirty-seven tribal court cases 
involving nonmembers and concluded that nonmember litigants 
had been treated in a fair manner.210 Professor Mark Rosen, 
reviewing civil rights cases brought in tribal courts, also agreed 
that "[m]ost of the cases are examples of responsible and good 
faith interpretation of [applicable law], and none of the cases 
involves patently outrageous reasoning or outcomes. "211 All of the 
cases reviewed by Professor Rosen involved Anglo-American legal 
constructs, and the tribal courts decided all of the cases 
employing intertribal common law.212 
207. Middlemist v. Member of the Tribal Council of the Confederated Salish & 
Kootenai Tribes, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6141 (Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes App. Ct. 
June 29, 1996). 
208. Newton, supra note 74, at 306. 
209. See id. at 307. (noting that the tribal court decision in Middlemist required the 
exhaustion of tribal administrative remedies before challenging the tribe's jurisdiction). 
210. See id. at 352 ("[T)he tribe does not always win against the individual, and the 
tribal member does not always defeat the non-Indian."). 
211. Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional 
Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 
573 (2000). 
212. See id. at 573-75 (citing, among other authorities, Schumacher v. Menominee 
Indian Tribe of Wis., 24 Indian L. Rep. 6084 (Menominee Tribal Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 1997) 
(perfection of security interest in collateral)); Muskogee (Creek) Nation v. Am. Tobacco 
Co., 25 Indian L. Rep. 6054 (Muscogee (Creek) Nation Okmulgee D. Ct. Feb. 12, 1998) 
(reviewing the rules of personal service); Means v. Dist. Court of the Chinle Judicial Dist., 
26 Indian L. Rep. 6083 (Navajo May 11, 1999) (reviewing a criminal misdemeanor against 
nonmember Indian decided on federal equal protection grounds); Shoshone Bus. Council 
v. Skillings, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6050 (Shoshone & Arapahoe Tribal Ct. App. 1994) 
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Professor Bethany Berger's recent article, Justice and the 
Outsider,213 is perhaps the most detailed look at the empirical 
evidence relating to the fairness of tribal courts to outsiders. 
Professor Berger analyzed the decisions of the Navajo Nation's 
tribal courts where a nonmember is a party.214 In ninety-five 
Navajo Nation Supreme Court opinions where a non-Navajo 
party opposed a Navajo party, the non-Navajo party won half of 
the cases.215 Relying upon a theory that parties with accurate 
information "will settle or fail to pursue cases in which they 
agree that one party is significantly more likely to win,',2l6 Berger 
concludes that "non-Navajo parties are at least as good at 
predicting their chances of success as are Navajo parties.,,217 The 
result "tends to undermine the assumption that the courts are 
unfair to these outsiders.'o2ls 
Though it is very difficult to draw comprehensive 
conclusions about tribal court fairness to outsiders from these 
small samples, it is notable that no study found evidence of the 
kind of unfairness that concerns the Court. 
B. Theorizing the Presumption of Tribal Court Jurisdiction 
In the coming years, the Supreme Court may decide to 
review a case where a member sues a nonmember in tribal court 
for committing a tort on reservation land.219 The open question of 
the presumption of tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers will 
then be before the Court.220 While tribal sovereignty will be 
weighed against the political rights of American citizens, the 
fundamental practical question is whether nonmembers will 
have their meaningful day in court. This Article's premise is that 
(reviewing a tribal membership issue». 
213. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in 
Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005). 
214. See id. at 1067. 
215. See id. at 1075 (reporting that of the ninety-five cases examined, the non-Indian 
party won 47.4%, but noting that until a recent surge in (often unsuccessful) challenges to 
tribal jurisdiction the rate was 50%). 
216. Id. at 1076 & n.161 (citing George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of 
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 51-52 (1984». 
217. Id. at 1077. 
218. Id. 
219. This is a different fact situation than Strate v. A·J Contractors, Inc., 520 U.S. 
438, 438 (1997) (involving a nonmember plaintiff and an off-reservation accident) and 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 355 (2001) (involving a state law enforcement officer as a 
defendant). 
220. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358 & n.2 (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 and citing 
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987» ("We leave open the question of 
tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in genera!."). 
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nonmembers will not be subject to "unusually difficult," 
confusing, unfair, or unfamiliar substantive law. As such, the 
Court should rule-as it suggested in National Farmers Union-
that tribal courts may be presumed to have civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers for disputes arising in Indian Country.221 
The Court's concerns that nonmember litigants will have 
important or even fundamental rights limited or even erased in 
tribal fora is belied by the realities of federal and state court 
practice. Commentators have long known that litigants and 
attorneys remove cases from state courts to federal courts under 
the federal removal statute222 because the defendants wish to 
employ procedural (not substantive) strategic ploys such as 
delay223 or because the defendant's attorney (not client) is 
unfamiliar with state or local courts.224 In addition, many state 
courts adjudicate cases of first impression on any number of 
subjects of law.225 Sometimes jurisdictions differ on whether to 
adopt a particular rule.226 This is all part of Justice Brandeis's 
vision of each jurisdiction serving as part of a "laboratory" of 
experimentation. Tribal courts may be a part of the 
"'jurisgenesis'" of tribal law and culture,227 as well as part of the 
learning from experience that all courts can do for each other. 
After all, the Founders took from English common law what they 
wanted and left the rest.228 
221. See supra note 39. 
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000). 
223. See Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 1057, 1089 (1989) (noting that defendants remove cases hoping the delay 
will deplete the plaintiffs resources). 
224. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under 
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 369, 402--{)3 (1992) 
(reporting that 77% of defense lawyers based removal decisions on their familiarity with 
the federal system). 
225. E.g., Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co., 584 P.2d 
15, 21, 23 (Alaska 1978) (adopting a common law doctrine of economic duress); Seehafer v. 
Seehafer, 704 N.W.2d 841, 843, 847 (N.D. 2005) (adopting rule that "tal spouse of a 
deceased joint tenant cannot claim a probate homestead on her husband's property when 
his interest in that property terminated on his death and she held no interest of her own 
in the property"); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Kathman, 748 N.E.2d 1091, 1095, 1097 (Ohio 
2001) (adopting a common law rule that licensed attorneys "aid" in unauthorized practice 
onaw when they assist nonattorneys in marketing or selling living trusts). 
226. Compare, e.g., Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. 207 (1825) (adopting and applying the 
material benefit rule in contract cases), with Harrington v. Taylor, 36 S.E.2d 227, 227 
(N.C. 1945) (refusing to adopt the material benefit rule). 
227. See Chamberlain v. Peters, 27 Indian L. Rep. 6085, 6096 (Saginaw Chippewa 
Indian Tribe of Mich. App. Ct. Jan. 5, 2000) (quoting Robert Cover, Foreward: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983»; POMMERSHEIM, supra note 82, at 101 
(attributing the term to Robert Cover); WILLIAMS, JR., supra note 56, at 20 (same). 
228. E.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936). 
In the light of all that has now been said, it is evident that the restricted rules of 
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On a pragmatic level, difficult tribal common law decisions 
can be explained. The Court already noted a mechanism in place 
to alleviate the concerns about "unusually difficult" tribal 
substantive law.229 Justice Stevens' National Farmers Union 
opinion argued that federal courts reviewing tribal court 
jurisdiction can utilize the opinions generated by those tribal 
courts to understand triballaw.230 The Court has not yet followed 
Justice Stevens' lead and examined a tribal court case for the 
purpose of understanding intertribal common law. Both of the 
tribal court cases cited by Justice Stevens involved nonmembers 
as parties. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Buum involved a tribal 
court judgment excluding a non-Indian from the Crow Creek 
Sioux Reservation for a period of one year and, when the 
nonmember violated the order, to ten days of confinement and a 
fine. 231 All of the legal questions in the Buum matter were Anglo-
American legal constructs that the tribal appellate court resolved 
using intertribal common law. These Anglo-American legal 
constructs included the notion of a "public nuisance,"232 the 
difference between a civil judgment and a criminal penalty,233 and 
"due process. ,,234 In Buum, the appellate court reversed the 
exclusion order on due process grounds, holding that the tribal 
court must meet several "due process" conditions in order to 
effectuate a civil exclusion order. 235 The tribal courts didn't rely 
upon "unusually difficult" tribal substantive law to prejudice the 
nonmember and, in fact, ruled in favor of the nonmember. 
[d. 
the English law in respect of the freedom of the press in force when the 
Constitution was adopted were never accepted by the American colonists, and 
that by the First Amendment it was meant to preclude the national government, 
and by the Fourteenth Amendment to preclude the states, from adopting any 
form of previous restraint upon printed publications, or their circulation, 
including that which had theretofore been effected by these two well-known and 
odious methods. 
229. See Barsh, supra note 167, at 81-82 (finding "tribal common law" often based on 
Anglo law and tribal courts disfavoring grounding their decisions on tradition even in 
internal social cases). 
230. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 
(1985) (citing N.D. ex ret. Wefald v. Kelly, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6059, 6060 (Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribal Ct. Oct. 4, 1983) (explaining the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code) and Crow 
Creek Sioux Tribe v. Buum, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6031, 6032 (Intertribal Ct. App. Apr. 1, 
1983) (explaining the Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Code)). 
231. See Buum, 10 Indian L. Rep. at 6031. 
232. [d. at 6032 (citing CROW CREEK SIOUX TRIBAL CODE §§ 07-07-01 to -04). 
233. See id. at 6033 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAwS §§ 16-15-1 to -15 (1995) and S.D. 
CODIFIED LAwS § 23A-38-1 (1998)). 
234. [d. at 6034. 
235. See id. 
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The Court's apparent presumption that tribal substantive 
law is unfair to nonmembers has no basis in fact. Tribal courts 
derive the substantive law that applies to nonmembers, 
intertribal common law, from Anglo-American common law.236 
Indian tribes adopt a statutory law that tends to mirror 
American laws for a reason-because they must be able to 
function in the American political system in a seamless manner. 
Because federal Indian policy drove tribal law underground for a 
decades-long interregnum, Indian tribes and tribal courts had to 
start, as a pragmatic matter, by borrowing federal and state law. 
Once tribal legislatures and tribal court establish a baseline of 
tribal law , it is natural and necessary that tribal courts will work 
to mold the law to meet the needs and realities of the tribal 
communities. Just as state and federal common law changes to 
accommodate community norms,237 tribal courts will adopt 
changes to the intertribal common law over time. There is 
nothing remarkable in changing the gradual course of the 
common law to reflect the community's choices.238 
V. CONCLUSION-THE SEVENTH FIRE 
The prophet of the Seventh Fire of the Ojibwe spoke of 
an Osh-ki-bi-ma-di-zeeg' (New People) that would emerge to 
retrace their steps to find what was left by the trail. There 
are Indian people today who believe that the New People 
are with us in the form of our youngest generation. This 
young generation is searching for their Native language. 
They are seeking out the few elders who have not forgotten 
the old ways. They are not finding meaning to their lives in 
the teachings of American society .... This younger 
generation is discovering the common thread that is 
236. See supra Part II. 
237. E.g., Sarah Howard Jenkins, Preemption & Supplementation Under Revised 1-
103: The Role of Common Law & Equity in the New U.C.C., 54 SMU L. REV. 495, 505 
(2001) ("As business ethics and values evolve and community mores change, the 
principles of common law and equity generally evolve to accommodate and control the 
innovative business practices, the novel modes of ordering and modifYing commercial 
relationships, variations in financing mechanisms, and commercial behavior that deviates 
from established social norms."); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 789, 798 (2002) ("The common law method substantially minimized the 
impact of legal transitions. In contrast to modem comprehensive legislative action, 
changes in the path of the common law occurred through gradual and episodic accretions 
to the existing body of judge-made norms."). 
238. See E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAw OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS 288 (Atheneum 1979) (1954) ("The evolution of law as a 
phase of societal evolution has been no more an undeviating lineal development than has 
been the evolution oflife forms in the organic world."). 
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interwoven among the traditional teachings of all natural 
I 239 peop e. 
Eddie Benton-Banai's description of the New People is a plea 
for the next generation of Indian people-and the generation 
after that, and so on-to reach back to learn the language and 
culture of their ancestors. Just as American Constitutional law 
scholars reach back to revisit the foundations of the United 
States Constitution,240 Indian people, lawyers, and scholars must 
reach back to revisit the foundations of their own laws. 
Traditional tribal law has all but disappeared from Indian 
Country, replaced with an amalgam of imposed and imported 
Anglo-American legal constructs.241 Tribal judges and Indian law 
scholars have long advocated for the restoration of traditional 
and customary law, but that work is far from complete and, in 
some places in Indian Country, it hasn't even begun. Since tribal 
common law is infused with tribal culture, neither can survive in 
the long run without the other. 
The irony of these developments is that the Supreme Court, 
taking a superficial look at tribal courts and tribal court 
jurisprudence, appears to be close to concluding that the 
restoration of tribal traditions and customs is complete.242 As a 
result, the Court may soon rule that tribal courts may never 
exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on the theory that 
tribal law is "unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out." The 
Court may make this final and conclusive judgment without 
knowing the facts on the ground. The reality is that tribal courts 
do not apply "unusually difficult" substantive law to cases 
involving nonmembers.243 As a matter of law and culture, 
"intratribal common law," exemplified by tribal customs and 
traditions, does not apply to nonmembers, by definition. 
"Intertribal common law," the law imposed and imported into the 
tribal community that mirrors state and federal common law to a 
significant extent, is that law that tribal courts would apply to 
disputes involving nonmembers. Also, tribal court judges, like 
state and federal judges, write legal opinions that explain the 
239. EDWARD BENTON-BANAl, THE MISHOMIS BOOK 111-12 (1979). 
240. E.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAlLURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 11 (2005) 
(seeking, through an examination of the Court's first decade, to "locate the changing role 
of the judiciary as a response to an even more fundamental constitutional 
transformation"); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION xii (2005) (providing an 
"opinionated biography" of the Constitution by scrutinizing the actions and decisions of 
the Founders and later generations of constitutional amenders). 
241. See supra Part II. 
242. See supra Part I. 
243. See supra Part II.A 
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application of tribal common law to a particular case. Justice 
Stevens wrote in 1985 that a federal court should review these 
opinions as necessary for explanations of tribal law and culture.244 
In the end, tribal courts decide matters of intertribal common 
law just as state and federal courts would. 
This Article delineates a proposed line between intertribal 
common law and intratribal common law as a means of 
explaining and emphasizing the difference between tribal law 
that applies in some circumstances to tribal members alone and 
tribal law that applies to members and nonmembers both. If the 
Court understands the distinction, its fears of subjecting 
nonmembers to unfair law should be allayed. Choosing to solidify 
the National Farmers Union presumption that tribal courts do 
have civil jurisdiction over nonmembers should not be 
controversial. Even a cursory review of tribal court decisions 
involving nonmembers shows that nonmembers are not 
prejudiced in tribal courts any more than a resident of Rhode 
Island would be prejudiced in Texas or Connecticut.245 
Eddie Benton-Banai's words of hope were tempered by his 
concern that the bullets and bayonets of early American Indian 
policy have been replaced with "less visible weapons.,,246 He 
believed that non-Indians sought "to absorb Indian people into 
the melting pot of American society .... The old ways, these 
teachings, are seen as unnecessary to the modern world.,,247 Much 
of Indian Country is populated by nonmembers-people who live 
and work on the reservation, intermarry with tribal members 
and raise tribal member children, and even participate in tribal 
politics and traditional ceremonies. A Supreme Court decision 
creating a bright-line rule that tribal courts cannot have civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers forces more and more Anglo-
American common law into Indian Country, rendering tribal 
custom and tradition irrelevant and useless. Over time, this will 
result in the continued erosion of tribal culture and tradition. 
Recognizing the jurisdiction of tribal courts over nonmembers 
would generate benefits to tribal communities-and all other 
American courts-through the jurisgenerative journey that tribal 
courts take every day in adjudicating the rights of people m 
Indian Country while preserving the rights of nonmembers. 
Miigwetch. 
244. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
245. See supra notes 213-218 and accompanying text (reviewing a study of Navajo 
courts and finding that nonmembers win almost 50% of the time). 
246. BENTON-BANAl, supra note 239, at 111. 
247. [d. 
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